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MICROCOMPUTERS, RISK ANALYSIS, AND LITIGATION
STRATEGY
by
STUART S. NAGEL'
Litigation strategy mainly refers to deciding whether to go to trial or settle
out of court. Risk analysis mainly refers to procedures for making meaningful
decisions when one alternative provides a reasonably certain benefit or cost
(like accepting a settlement), and another alternative provides a benefit or cost
that is contingent on the occurrence of a probabilistic event (like going to trial).
Microcomputers mainly refer to self-sufficient machines that are capable of
making probabilistic and other useful calculations quickly, accurately, and
easy to understand.
This article covers three important aspects of litigation strategy. The first
part is concerned with varieties of sensitivity analysis in civil and criminal
cases. Sensitivity analysis refers to how the bottom-line conclusion of going to
trial, accepting a settlement, or choosing another alternative is affected by
changes in the inputs, which mainly relate to such matters or criteria as (1) the
predicted damages, (2) the probability of receiving them, (3) the settlement of-
fered, (4) the litigation costs, and (5) the settlement costs.
The second part deals with the use of decision matrices and microcom-
puters for analyzing litigation-strategy decisions, including sensitivity analysis.
A decision matrix involves putting (1) the alternatives to be decided on the
rows, (2) the criteria for deciding among them on the columns, and (3) the rela-
tions between the alternatives and the criteria in the cells.
The third part deals with the leading alternative to the decision-matrix ap-
proach to litigation strategy. That leading alternative is the decision-tree ap-
proach. A decision tree tends to involve only two alternatives. At least one of
them branches into various paths toward various outcomes. Each path may
have different probabilities. Each outcome may have a different monetary
value.'
I. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND LITIGATION STRATEGY
The article is built around two key civil and criminal examples which are
*Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois; member of the Illinois Bar. B.S., 1957, J.D., 1958,
Ph.D., 1961, Northwestern University.
'On systematic litigation strategy in general, see TULLOCK. THE LOGIC OF THE LAW (1971); Greenberg,
Quantitative Aspects of Legal Analysis, INS. L.J. 589-607 (1976); Nagel, Applying Decision Science to the
Practice of Law, 30 PRAC. LAW. 13-22 (1984); S. NAGEL. APPLYING DECISION SCIENCE To LAW PRACTICE
(American Law Institute-American Bar Association, 1984). On sensitivity analysis in general, see C. MOORE.
PROFITABLE APPLICATIONS OF THE BREAK-EVEN SYSTEM (1971); NAGEL. PUBLIC POLICY: GOALS, MEANS
AND METHODS 296-322 (1984) (Unknown Variables).
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embodied in the first two tables. The first table deals with damages litigation. It
illustrates such aspects of sensitivity analysis as (1) the basic data needed, (2)
variations possible on the basic data, (3) threshold values above or below which
the best alternative changes, (4) insensitivity ranges within which change can
occur without affecting the best alternative, (5) change slopes showing how
much the gap changes between the first and second alternatives as a result of a
one-unit change in each input, (6) multiple threshold values which involve
more than one input changing simultaneously, (7) worst and best scenario
analysis, and (8) the relevance of microcomputers to these forms of sensitivity
analysis.2
The second table deals with criminal prosecution. It illustrates such
aspects of sensitivity analysis as (1) incremental analysis which involves com-
paring the gain of one alternative with the gain of a second alternative on each
criterion, (2) precentaging analysis which converts years, dollars, and other
criteria into dimensionless percentages for comparison purposes, (3) criterion
weights for indicating the relative importance of criteria measured on different
dimensions, (4) convergence analysis which indicates at what point each input
becomes large enough to cause allocation percentages to reach a maximum,
and (5) the relevance of microcomputers to these forms of sensitivity analysis.'
A. Damages Litigation
1. The Initial Analysis
Table 1 shows some data for illustrating basic varieties of sensitivity
analysis. The problem is one of deciding whether to accept a settlement or go
to trial in a damages case from the perspective of a plaintiff's attorney
operating under a contingency fee arrangement. The criterion in choosing be-
tween those alternatives is to maximize average income minus average ex-
penses. The data is hypothetical for illustrative methodological purposes.
'On a decision analysis of damages litigation, see Friedman, An Analysis of Settlement 22 STAN. L. REV. 67
(1969); Greenberg, The Lawyer's Use of Quantitative Analysis in Settlement Negotiations, 38 Bus. LAW.
1557-86 (1983); S. NAGEL & M. NEEF, DECISION THEORY AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 141-46 (1979) (Out-Of-
Court Civil Sellouts).
3On a decision analysis of criminal prosecution, see Lachman & McLauchlan, MODELING THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 145-58 (1977) (Models of Plea Bargaining); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
429-60 (1977) (Civil and Criminal Procedure); NAGEL & NEEF, DECISION THEORY AND LEGAL PROCESS
63-140 (1979) (The Two-Person Bargaining Situation in Plea Bargaining).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:1
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TABLE 1
Sensitivity Analysis for Plaintiff Litigation Strategy in a Damages Case"
Criteria
A verage A verage Net
Income (Y) Expenses (Y 2) Gain
Thresh- Thresh-
Cell # hold Cell # hold
and Change and Change
Alternatives Range Slope Range Slope
al -$1 a2 +$I
Accept a
Settlement (Xa) $1,000 $300 $700
($1,200 up to oo) ($100 up to OD)
($1,200 down to $0) ($100 down to $0)
bl +$1 b2 -$1
Go to
Trial (Xb) $2,400 $1,500 $900
($2,200 down to $0) ($1,700 down to $0)
($2,200 up to o) ($1,700 up to oo)
'Notes:
a. The symbol in the upper lefthand corner of each main cell shows (I) the alternative under consideration
by a lower-case letter, and (2) the criterion under consideration by an arabic numerical.
b. The number in the middle of each main cell shows the average or predicted value of the alternative on the
criterion.
c. The lower number in each main cell shows the threshold value of the alternative on the criterion (e.g., the
$1,200 in cell I). That is the value to which the predicted value would have to change in order for the first
and second place alternatives to be tied. The threshold value is always the predicted value plus or minus
the profit gap which is the difference between the net gain of trial and the net gain of settlement.
d. The ranges at the bottom of each cell show how much the average or predicted value could change
without affecting which alternative is in first place. The first range favors trial, and the second range
favors settlement.
e. The number in the upper righthand corner of each main cell shows by how much the gap in net gain
would change between the first and second place alternatives if the average or predicted value were to go
up by one unit.
f. The numbers in the net gain column show the initial results before doing the sensitivity analyses. They
indicate that going to trial is the better alternative by a $200 difference.
Summer, 1985]
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The first cell shows that a settlement offer has been made that will
generate $1,000 in income, figuring a 20% contingent fee on a $5,000 offer.
The second cell reading down shows that going to trial will generate $2,400 in
predicted income, figuring a 40% contingent fee on an average damage award
of $6,000. The $6,000 can be determined by averaging similar previous cases,
including those in which no damages were awarded. A less simple alternative is
to note that the prior cases in which damages were awarded averages $10,000,
and 60% of the cases resulted in damages awarded. The third cell on the ex-
pense column shows the cost of a settlement would be $300, figuring ten hours
of time that is worth thirty dollars an hour to the lawyer involved. The last cell
shows the cost of going to trial would be $1,500, figuring twenty-five hours of
time that is worth sixty dollars an hour to the lawyer involved.
With that hypothetical data, one can initially conclude that on the
average it would be more profitable to go to trial than to accept a settlement in
that particular case or that type of case. Going to trial yields a net gain of $900,
whereas accepting a settlement yields a net gain of only $700. That conclusion
should not be influenced by the initial offer of the defendant. In other words, if
the plaintiff succeeds in getting the defendant to move from one dollar to one
thousand dollars, the settlement should be just as strongly rejected as if the
defendant had moved down from $1,100 to $1,000. An acceptable settlement
is one that is better than going to trial, not necessarily one that involves hard-
won concessions.
2. The Sensitivity Variations
The situation can be made more realistic, although more complicated, by
adding a non-monetary criterion of attitude toward risk by the lawyer. It could
be scored highly favorable (five points), mildly favorable (four points), neutral
(three points), mildly unfavorable (two points), and highly unfavorable (one
point). Dealing with non-monetary criteria will be the key variation in Table 2
dealing with criminal cases from a prosecution perspective. One might,
however, note that one's attitude toward risk should logically become more un-
favorable when the size of the settlement becomes greater. One then not only
has the risk of losing the case, but also the risk of losing a large settlement and
the risk of suffering long-term regret as a result of being unlucky enough to
have been on the losing side of an unaverage case with insufficient opportunity
to average out over a large set of similar cases.
We could also add to the alternatives by referring to types of settlements
and types of trials, such as a bench trial or a jury trial. We could also talk in
terms of a different overall goal than maximizing lawyer income minus lawyer
expense, such as client income minus client expense, or some combination of
the two goals. We could also vary the problem to cover cases with an hourly
rate or a flat fee, rather than a contingency fee, and to cover cases from the
perspective of defense counsel in damages litigation.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19: I
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The threshold values in parenthesis at the bottom of each cell involve ap-
plying a sensitivity analysis to Table 1. They show, for example, that the sec-
ond place alternative would come up to the net gain of the first place alter-
native if any one of the following occurrences were to happen:
(1) The settlement offer is increased from $5,000 to $6,000. Doing so in-
creases the 20% settlement fee from $1,000 to $1,200, and increases
the settlement net gain from $700 to $900.
(2) The predicted damages from trial is decreased from $6,000 to $5,500.
Doing so decreases the 40% damages fee from $2,400 to $2,200.
(3) The settlement expense is decreased from $300 to $100 by decreasing
the hours and/or the hourly cost.
(4) The trial expense is increased from $1,500 to $1,700 by increasing the
hours and/or the hourly cost.'
Along related lines, the insensitivity ranges in parenthesis at the bottom of
each cell also tell us:
(1) The settlement fee can range from $0 up to $1,200 and have no effect
on which alternative is in first place. This is referred to as the insen-
sitivity range of an alternative on a criterion.
(2) The trial fee can range from $2,200 up to infinity and have no effect
on which alternative is in first place. Knowing the insensitivity range
is useful in informing one of the range of numbers that are not worth
arguing over in terms of the bottom-line conclusion.
(3) The settlement expense can range from zero to one hundred dollars
without affecting the outcome.
(4) The trial expense can range from $1,700 to infinity without affecting
the outcome of the trial alternative being in first place. That allows a
lot of room for error in estimating the trial expense or in estimating
any of the decisional inputs.
Change slopes are another informative measure in sensitivity analysis.
They are the numbers in the upper right-hand corner of each of the main cells.
They show how much the gap in net gain changes between the first place and
second place alternatives when each input is increased by one unit. In this
table, those numbers tell us:
(1) If the settlement fee increases by one dollar, the gap decreases by one
dollar.
(2) If the trial fee increases by one dollar, the gap increases by one dollar.
(3) If the settlement expense increases by one dollar, the gap increases by
one dollar.
(4) If the trial expense increases by one dollar, the gap decreases by one
dollar.
'For further detail on threshold analysis in the legal context, see Nagel, Lawyer Decision Making and
Threshold Analysis. 36 U. MIAMi L. REv. 615-42 (1982).
Summer, 19851
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That kind of information can often be helpful in indicating what changes can
have the most impact. In this simple situation, however, all the one-unit
changes have the same marginal rate of return, although in different direc-
tions. Change slopes can also show by how much the percentage of scarce
resources allocated to an alternative will change as a result of a one unit
change in each input. Allocation problems are referred to in connection with
Table 1.
Multiple threshold values are another form of sensitivity analysis. In
Table 1, the threshold values for each input assume the predicted values for
the other inputs are held constant. One might, however, ask what are the com-
bined threshold values of two or more inputs, such as trial income and trial ex-
pense. The answer to that example is any pair of numbers for b I and b2 such
that b 1 minus b2 equals $700. Likewise, the combined threshold values for a 1
and a2 are any pair of numbers such that a 1 minus a2 equals $900. On a higher
level of generality, one could talk in terms of the basic threshold or break-even
equation which in this context is a I minus a2 equals b I minus b2. That means
the combined threshold value of al and b] is any pair of numbers that will
preserve the equality. Likewise, the combined threshold values of any three in-
puts like a2, b 1, and b2 are any three numbers that will preserve the equality.
Worst and best scenario analysis is still another form of sensitivity
analysis. It involves giving a range to each input value. One end of the range is
the reasonable score that most disfavors a settlement, and the other end of the
range is the reasonable score that most favors a settlement rather than a trial.
With ranges like that for each of the four inputs, the net gain would also be a
range. On the settlement row, the net gain might thus be a low of $400 and a
high of $1,200. On the trial row, the net gain might be a low of $600 and a high
of $1,600. Thus the mid-point on that settlement range would be $800, and the
mid-point on the trial range would be $1,100. One could, therefore, conclude
the following:
(1) If the worst trial net-gain is better than the best settlement net-gain,
then going to trial is obviously better.
(2) If the net-gain ranges overlap as here, it makes sense to choose the
alternative which has the higher mid-point.
(3) One does not normally look to which alternative has the highest max-
imum or the highest minimum in choosing the best alternative.
B. Criminal Prosecution
1. The Basic Problem And Data
Table 2 shows the basic data for illustrating sensitivity analysis as applied
to prosecution litigation strategy in a criminal case. The problem here is one of
deciding whether to accept a plea bargain or to go to trial from a prosecutor's
perspective. The overall criterion is to maximize benefits minus costs, but here
the benefits are non-monetary, and the costs are monetary.
[Vol. i 9: i
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The first cell shows that defense counsel, the public defender, or the
defendant has offered to plead guilty to a recommended two year sentence.
The second cell reading down shows that going to trial will generate a
predicted sentence of three and one-half years. The three and one-half years
can be determined by averaging previous similar cases including those in which
there was no sentence due to an acquittal, probation, or a suspended sentence.
A less simple alternative is to note that the prior cases in which sentences were
given averaged five years, and seventy percent of the cases resulted in convic-
tions and sentences. The third cell on the expense column shows the cost of a
plea bargain would be $240, figuring twelve hours of time that is paid at twen-
ty dollars an hour to the assistant state's attorney. The last cell shows the cost
of going to trial would be $720, figuring thirty-six hours of time that is paid at
twenty dollars an hour.
2. Handling Non-monetary Benefits
In Table I, we were able to subtract the costs from the benefits because
both were measured in dollars. In Table 2, that is not possible since the benefits
are measured in years, and the costs are measured in dollars on each alter-
native. Incremental analysis is one way to approach this data. It involves deter-
mining the difference down each criterion rather than across each alternative.
Doing so shows that the difference on sentencing is one and one-half years
favoring trial, and the difference on expense is $480 favoring settlement. The
problem can thus be treated as one of determining whether the prosecutor
would prefer to obtain an extra one and one-half years in sentencing or $480 in
expenses saved. If the one and one-half years is preferred, then the prosecutor
should go to trial. If the $480 is preferred, then the prosecutor should accept
the settlement.
That approach works well for dealing with criteria measured on different
dimensions when there are only two criteria and two alternatives, as in Table
2. With more than two criteria, one will have more than two differences, some
of which will favor the first alternative and some the second alternative. With
more than two alternatives, one will have to compare alternative A with B.
The winner then gets compared with C. The alternative that wins that compar-
ison then gets compared with alternative D, and so on until one has gone
through all the alternatives. The last uneliminated alternative is the overall
winner.
To avoid the complexities of incremental analysis with multiple criteria
and/or multiple alternatives, one can use part/whole percentaging analysis to
deal with the problem of criteria measured on different dimensions. That ap-
proach involves adding down each criterion to determine the total or whole,
which is five and one-half years on sentencing and $960 on expenses. One then
divides each score on each criterion by the total or whole for the criterion.
Thus two years is converted into thirty-six percent of five and one-half years,
[Vol. 19: I
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and three and one-half years is converted into sixty-four percent. Likewise,
$240 is converted into twenty-five percent of $960, and $720 is converted into
seventy-five percent. One can now subtract the percentage cost from the per-
centage benefits, because percentages have a dimensionless character which
years and dollars do not have. Making that subtraction yields a net gain of plus
eleven percentage points for accepting a settlement, and minus eleven percent-
age points for going to trial. One can therefore conclude from this unweighted
part/whole percentaging analysis that accepting a settlement is the better alter-
native.
The defect in this analysis is that it does not consider the relative impor-
tance of the two criteria. One way to deal with that is to go through the follow-
ing steps:
(1) Decide which criterion is the least important. Assign it a weight of
one. For example, assign expense a weight of one.
(2) Decide how many more times each other criterion is more important
than the base criterion. For example, assign sentencing a weight of
two.
(3) Multiply each part/whole percentage by the weight of the criterion to
which the percentage pertains. If the criterion is negative like expense,
then consider the weight as being negative. This means thirty-six per-
cent and sixty-four percent get multiplied by two, and twenty-five per-
cent and seventy-five percent get multiplied by minus one.
(4) Add the weighted part/whole percentages across each alternative.
This means adding seventy-two percent to minus twenty-five percent
for accepting settlement, which yields forty-seven percent. It also
means adding 128% to minus seventy-five percent for trial, which
yields fifty-three percent.
(5) Observe which alternative has the highest or best weighted part/whole
percentage. In the above example, trial is the best alternative with a
weighted p/w% of fifty-three percent versus forty-seven percent for a
settlement.7
3. The Sensitivity Variations
Each number in parenthesis in Table 2 is the threshold value for the alter-
native on the criterion to which the threshold value pertains. The threshold
values in Table 2 can be interpreted as follows:
(1) If the two-year settlement were only 1.38 years, then there would be a
tie between settlement and trial, assuming equal weights for sentenc-
ing and expense.
'For further details on dealing with non-monetary benefits and other multidimensional goals, see SAATY,
THE ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS: PLANNING, PRIORITY SETTING, RESOURCE ALLOCATION (1980); ED-
WARDS & NEWMAN, MULTI-ATTRIBUTE EVALUATION (1982); and Nagel, Part/Whole Percentaging and the
Useful Method in Policy/Program Evaluation 8 EVALUATION & PROGRAM PLANNING 107 (1985).
Summer, 19851
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(2) If the three and one-half year average trial sentence were 4.12 years,
then there would also be a tie assuming the other inputs are held con-
stant.
(3) If the $240 for settlement expense were $346, there would be a tie. Put
differently, if the settlement expense were more than $346, trial would
be the better alternative.
(4) If the $720 for trial expense were $614, there would be a tie. Put dif-
ferently, if the trial expense were less than $614, trial would be the
better alternative.
Each of those threshold values can be instantly shown with the floppy
disk program called Policy/Goal Percentaging Analysis, mentioned at the end
of the previous section on damages litigation. One can also determine the
threshold values with a hand calculator in a simple situation like this with only
two alternatives and two criteria. When we were dealing with criteria that
were all measured on the same dimension, as in Table 1, the threshold equa-
tion was a l - a2 = b I - b2. Where part/whole percentaging is involved, the
threshold equation is al/(al +bl) - a2/(al +bl) = bl/(bl +b2) - b2/(bl +b2).
Thus in either situation, if one wants to determine the threshold value for any
input one inserts the numerical values for the other inputs into the threshold
equation and solves for the value of the input that is represented by a letter.
One can also determine a threshold weight by solving for W in a similar
manner. Thus with the data from Table 2, the appropriate threshold equation
would be, W(36) - (25) = W(64) - (75). That equation simplifies to 36W - 25
= 64W - 75, and to 75 - 25 = 64W - 36W, and to 50 = 28W. Thus the
threshold weight is 50/28 or 1.79 which rounds off to a threshold weight of 2.
That means if sentencing is less than twice as important as saving money, then
accept the settlement. If, however, sentencing is at least twice as important as
saving money, then go to trial. Table 2 could also show the insensitivity ranges
and the change slopes, as the microcomputer program and Table 1 do. One
might also note the program is capable of doing an incremental analysis with
any number of alternatives and criteria, but incremental analysis does not lend
itself to sensitivity analysis the way part/whole percentaging does.
4. Allocation And Sensitivity
Allocating scarce resources is another type of litigation strategy besides
accepting a settlement versus going to trial in civil or criminal cases We could
add a Table 3 to illustrate allocation analysis and its special forms of sensitivity
analysis. For the sake of simplicity, however, assume that the alternatives in
'For further details on allocation analysis, see MCMILLAN, MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING: AN INTRODUC-
TION To THE DESIGN AND APPLICATION OF OPTIMAL DECISION MACHINES (1970); SHOUP & MEHAY, PRO-
GRAM BUDGETING FOR URBAN POLICE SERVICES (1971); S. NAGEL, POLICY EVALUATION: MAKING OPTIMUM
DECISIONS 179-254 (1982) (Finding an Optimum Mix in Allocating Scarce Resources).
[Vol. 19:1
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Table 2 are two different cases or projects, rather than settlement versus trial.
Also assume that both criteria are desirable goals, rather than benefits and
costs. If only the first criterion were being considered, one would allocate
thirty-six percent of one's time, money, or other resources to the first case and
sixty-four percent to the second case, assuming that thirty-six percent and
sixty-four percent satisfy the minimum ethical or other constraints. If both
criteria were being considered, one would average their respective part/whole
percentages. That means allocating thirty and one-half percent of the resources
to the first project and sixty-nine and one-half percent of the resources to the
second project, assuming both criteria are positive. If any criterion is negative,
then allocate in proportion to the sum of the weighted part/whole percentages,
but give nothing but the minimum to any case or project that has a negative or
losing sum.
Ordinary threshold analysis is not so applicable to an allocation problem
because such an analysis tells us the value of each input at the point where the
second place alternative becomes the first place alternative. That is useful in a
problem designed to determine which alternative is best. In an allocation prob-
lem, however, the second place alternative (and even alternatives lower than
second place) are generally allocated some portion of the scarce resources. In
an allocation problem, one might want to know at what convergence value a
disputed weight or other input becomes so large that the alternative which the
input favors comes close to its maximum allocation (i.e., within five percentage
points). For example, if the weight of sentencing were infinity or a huge
number, then the allocation would be thirty-six percent to Project 1 and sixty-
four percent to Project 2 since the goal of high sentencing would totally
dominate the other goals.
Convergence analysis tells us the weight (short of infinity) where the
allocation will be at least thirty-one percent and sixty-nine percent, which is
within five percentage points of thirty-six percent and sixty-four percent. One
amazing aspect of convergence analysis is that often a weight of two is in effect
the equivalent of infinity because it produces virtually the same effect. In the
simple example of Table 2, a weight of two for sentencing does have that effect
because a weight of one results in allocations of thirty and one-half and sixty-
nine and one-half percent. Thus, moving up to a weight of two increases the
thirty and one-half percent over thirty-one percent, and doing so decreases the
sixty-nine and one-half percent below sixty-nine percent. The microcomputer
program informs the user of the convergence value of each input, with con-
vergence defined as being within five percentage points of the maximum or
whatever definition the user wants.'
'See supra note 8.
Summer, 19851
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C. Some Conclusions On Sensitivity Analysis
From the analysis, one can conclude that it is useful in decision-making
situations to know the following:
1. The goals one is seeking to achieve, the alternatives available, and the
relations between goals and alternatives.
2. The threshold value for each goal-weight and relation, showing to
what value those inputs would have to change in order to enable the
second place alternative to become the first place alternative.
3. The insensitivity ranges for each input showing how much the input
could range below or above the threshold without affecting the alter-
native that is in first place.
4. The change slope for each input, showing how much the gap changes
in the profitability of two alternatives as a result of a one-unit change
in each input.
5. Multiple threshold values, showing how much two or more inputs
need to change in order to enable the second place alternative to
become the first place alternative.
6. Worst and best scenario analysis, showing for an alternative the worst
it could do if all the inputs were scored least favorably, or showing the
best it could do if all the inputs were scored most favorably.
7. Threshold percentage values, showing for each input the value to
which those inputs would have to change to enable the second place al-
ternative to become the first place alternative where part/whole per-
centages are used to deal with goals being measured on different
dimensions.
8. Allocation change slopes for each input, showing how much the
percentage allocation to each alternative would change if there were a
one-unit change in each input.
9. The convergence value for each input, showing at what value the in-
put reaches a point where the alternative that it favors is within a cer-
tain number of percentage points from the maximum that the alter-
native could be allocated.
From the analysis, one can also conclude that it is useful in decision-
making situations to experiment with how the bottom-line conclusion changes
as a result of making such changes in the inputs as:
1. Adding or subtracting an alternative.
2. Adding or subtracting a criterion.
3. Rewording an alternative or a criterion.
4. Adding a minimum requirement or an alternative or a criterion.
5. Adding a maximum requirement on an alternative or a criterion.
6. Re-defining how a criterion is to be measured.
7. Changing the weights as to the relative importance of the criteria.
[Vol. 19: I
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8. Changing the scores of one or more alternatives on one or more
criteria.
9. Changing the method for dealing with multi-dimensional criteria.
10. Changing what weights or relations are considered to be unknown.
11. Changing the method of dealing with conflicting constraints.
12. Changing the type of alternatives from a small set of discrete alter-
natives to a continuum of possibilities.
13. Changing the problem from one of going to trial to a related but dif-
ferent problem, such as whether to appeal, how much time to devote
to a case, or the order in which to process cases.
II. MICROCOMPUTERS As DECISION AIDS
A. Damages Cases
1. Criteria For Choosing Between Settlement And Trial
The criteria for deciding between those alternatives include benefit items
such as (1) the average damages in similar cases when damages are awarded, (2)
the proportion of similar cases in which defendants are found liable, and (3) the
proportion of the damages that goes to the attorney in a contingent fee rela-
tion. The criteria also include such cost items as (1) the number of hours likely
to be consumed by each alternative and (2) the hourly cost for each alternative.
Additional benefit and cost criteria could be added such as number of months
to collect and the going interest rate in order to calculate the present value for
damages to be awarded later versus a settlement offered now. Once one
understands the handling of the criteria in Table 3 however, it is relatively easy
to add additional criteria.
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Within the cells of Table 3 are shown hypothetical figures indicating how
each alternative scores on each criterion. Reading across the settlement row,
an offer of $5,000 has been made. If the percentage fee is twenty percent, then
the total benefits or income will be $1,000. On the other row, going to trial
means an average award of $10,000 if damages are awarded. Only about sixty
out of one hundred cases like this, however, result in damages being awarded.
We therefore discount the $10,000 by .60 to obtain an expected value of
$6,000. Doing so is the equivalent of saying that six out of ten cases like this
would generate an average of $10,000 in damages apiece, and four out of ten
cases would generate no damages. We then, in effect, sum those ten amounts
to obtain $60,000 and divide by ten to obtain an average of $6,000. We then
apply a forty percent fee to the average trial damages and obtain a predicted
total income of $2,400.
Going to trial thus does better on predicted benefits than accepting a set-
tlement. A settlement, however, does better on having lower costs. Settling
would only involve a predicted ten hours, valued at thirty dollars an hour, for a
total cost of $300. Going to trial would involve a predicted twenty-five hours,
valued at sixty dollars an hour, for a total cost of $1,500. If we subtract the
predicted total cost from the predicted total income we obtain a $700 profit
from accepting a settlement. The predicted profit from going to trial, however,
is $900.
Those calculations are from the perspective of the benefits and the costs
of the lawyer. Column 10 uses the benefits and costs of the client, which pro-
vide an interesting contrast. From the client's perspective, the total benefits
from settling are eighty percent of the $5,000 in Column 3. That $4,000 figure
is the net item for the client in the context of the amounts shown in Table 3
since the client does not pay for the lawyer's hours in a contingency fee ar-
rangement. Likewise, on the trial row, the total client benefits are sixty percent
of the $6,000. That $3,600 net figure for going to trial is $400 less than the
$4,000 for settling. This is in contrast to the lawyer's perspective where going
to trial is the more profitable alternative.
Under such circumstances, the lawyer has an ethical obligation to put the
client's interest ahead of the lawyer's interest. The ideal situation, however, is
to make the settlement alternative (which is better for the client) also better for
the lawyer, or to make the trial alternative (which is better for the lawyer) also
better for the client. Sensitivity analysis can be helpful in clarifying how that
can be done. Such analysis is helpful even if the same alternative is better from
both perspectives. If, for example, the trial alternative were better from both
perspectives, then the lawyer would go to trial although he might reconsider if
(1) avoiding the psychological problems of going to trial is worth more than the
$200 difference in profit, or (2) some of the amounts in Table 3 are subject to
change to make the settlement profit higher than the trial profit. That is where
sensitivity analysis especially comes in.
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Table 4 shows the tie-causing values for each information item in the
Table 3 analysis. Determining the tie-causing values is the essence of sensitivi-
ty analysis. For example, if the settlement offer can be raised from $5,000 to
$6,000, then there would be a tie between the new profit figures of settlement
and trial. This is so because a twenty percent fee applied to $6,000 would gen-
erate total income of $1,200. If we subtract the $300 in costs from the $1,200
in income, we then get $900 which is the trial profit figure. Thus, any settle-
ment offer greater than $6,000 would make settlement more profitable than
going to trial assuming (1) the other figures in Table 3 remain the same, and (2)
those figures are reasonably accurate as known by attorneys who are knowl-
edgeable about the specific kind of damages case which is being considered.
One could check to see that changing any of the amounts in Table 3 to
any of the amounts in Table 4 will result in either (1) raising the settlement
profit from $700 to $900, or (2) lowering the trial profit from $900 to $700. For
example, suppose the number of hours involved in going to trial were wrongly
estimated at twenty-five when they were really about 28.33. Multiplying sixty
dollars an hour by 28.33 gives a total cost of $1,700. That total cost is $200
more than the original total cost of $1,500. The $900 profit from going to trial
would thus drop to $700. That means if going to trial were to consume more
than 28.33 hours, then it would be better to accept the settlement.
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Table 5 shows the tie-causing values from the client's perspective. Each
figure in the second row of that table shows what it would take to improve the
trial alternative to make it as desirable from the client's perspective as the set-
tlement alternative. For example, if the client is offered a thirty-three percent
contingency fee arrangement, rather than a forty percent arrangement, then
going to trial would generate for the client the same $4,000 in net profit. This
is so because if the percentage fee is thirty-three, then the client gets sixty-
seven percent of the $6,000 expected value, which means the client on the
average gets $4,000. Lowering the trial percentage free from forty percent to
thirty-three percent, however, would then cause settlement to be the more
profitable alternative for the lawyer. A better effect would occur if the lawyer
can improve the trial alternative sufficiently so that the average damages when
awarded are $11,111 rather than $10,000, since $11,111 times a sixty percent
probability times the complement of a forty percentage fee is also $4,000.
Likewise, raising the probability of receiving damages to sixty-seven percent
would generate an expected value (on the $10,000 base) of $6,667 and sixty
percent of that is $4,000.
Thus, by looking at data like that shown in Tables 4 and 5 the lawyer can
see what it would take to make a settlement more attractive than going to trial
from the lawyer's perspective. If the lawyer can succeed in improving the set-
tlement offer to $6,000, then both the lawyer and the client would be better off
with that alternative. Likewise, if the lawyer can succeed in improving the trial
damages to $11,111, then both the lawyer and the client would be better off
with that alternative. This kind of sensitivity analysis does help clarify what it
would take to bring the second place alternative up to first place and addition-
ally, what it would take to reconcile what otherwise might be a conflict of in-
terest.
3. Solving For Tie-causing Values
All the amounts in Table 4 can be calculated by using simple high school
algebra. To do so, we need to express the nine criteria in algebraic symbols
which could consist of the following:
1. D = average damages if one gets them.
2. P = probability of receiving damages or expected value.
3. PD = average damages or expected value.
4. F = percentage fee.
5. FPD = total benefits.
6. H = number of hours.
7. C = cost per hour.
8. HC = total cost.
9. FPD-HC = benefits minus costs.
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We also need to recognize that at the break-even point, FPD-HC of settl-
ing equals FPD-HC of going to trial. Thus, in order to solve for any one of the
eighteen numbers in Table 4 one inserts the estimated values from Table 1 for
all the information items except the one for which a tie-causing value is being
calculated. For example, if we want to know the tie-causing value of the settle-
ment offer, we solve the equation (D)(1.00)(.20)-(10)($30) =
($10,000)(.60)(.40)-(25)($60). The equation simplifies to (D)(.20)-$300 = $900.
Using the methods of high school algebra, D = ($1,200)/(.20) = $6,000.
The algebra is even easier for calculating the tie-causing values in Table 5
from the client's perspective. The threshold equation is then PD times I-F of
settling set equal to PD times I-F of going to trial. Thus, to determine any fig-
ure in Table 5, each of the variables gets a turn at being the unknown variable
to be solved when known or given amounts are inserted for the other variables.
4. Dealing With Two Or More Tie-causing Values
Tables 4 and 5 show the tie-causing value for each information item if all
the other information items are held constant at their original values in Table
3. Suppose, however, one wants to know what combinations of D and P will
generate a tie between trial and settlement. One could change the question to
ask for the tie-causing value of DP, which is $6,500. The answer to the original
question, however, is that there are an infinite number of combinations of D
and P that generate a tie between settlement and trial. These include $9,167
and sixty percent, $10,000 and fifty-five percent, and numerous combinations
in between. The fully developed microcomputer program will show all those
combinations as a curve on a graph, with the damages on the vertical axis and
the probability of victory on the horizontal axis. One can then decide whether
the predicted combination of P and D is likely to be above that tie-causing
curve, just as one can decide whether a predicted value is likely to be above or
below a tie-causing value in Table 4 or 5.
The analysis can also be extended to three values by thinking in terms of a
tie-causing band across the graph, rather than just a curve, provided that one
can indicate a minimum and maximum value for each variable. It is even possi-
ble to work with more than three values simultaneously if necessary.
5. Variations On The Basic Ideas
There are a number of variations on the basic ideas shown in Tables 3, 4,
and 5 concerning fee-paying arrangements, a defense perspective, and the in-
troduction of non-monetary criteria. On fee-paying arrangements, Tables 3
and 4 involve a percentage fee. If a case involves an hourly fee, then the total
benefits from the lawyer's perspective equal the number of hours multiplied by
the hourly fee. If the case involves a flat fee, then the total benefits equal the
flat fee. From the client's perspective, the benefits minus costs with an hourly
[Vol. i 9: I
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fee become PD minus the number of hours multiplied by the hourly fee. If the
case involves a flat fee, then the net item becomes PD minus the flat fee.
The tables show the perspective of a plaintiff. From a defense perspective,
damages and the probability of paying them represent additional cost items,
rather than benefit items. Thus, the defense perspective wants to choose the
alternative between settlement and going to trial which will provide the lower
total costs where total costs are PD plus the total hourly cost. There is normal-
ly no conflict between the defense attorney in damages cases and his or her
client. The defense attorney is normally a salaried employee of the client, and
they both are interested in keeping down both the damages awarded and the
total hourly cost.
One could add a non-monetary criterion to Table 3 called psychological
case enjoyment. It could be scored on a 1-5 scale, where 5 = great pleasure, 4
= mild pleasure, 3 = no pleasure, 2 = mild displeasure, and 1 = great
displeasure. For a lawyer who greatly enjoys trials, going to trial might receive
a 5 and settling a 3. A non-monetary variable like that can be handled through
part/whole percentaging, the same as the non-monetary variable of average
prison sentence. That is a criterion in criminal cases to which we now turn.
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B. Criminal Cases
1. Criteria For Choosing Between Settlement And Trial
Table 6 shows relevant data for a criminal case. The alternatives are settle
or go to trial. The criteria for deciding between those alternatives include
benefit items such as (1) the average sentence in similar cases if defendants are
found guilty, (2) the proportion of similar cases in which defendants are found
guilty, and (3) the average sentence awarded which is discounted or multiplied
by the probability of a sentence being received. The criteria also include such
cost items as (1) the number of hours likely to be consumed by each alter-
native, (2) the hourly cost for each alternative, and (3) the hours multiplied by
the hourly cost.
Within the cells of Table 6 are shown hypothetical figures indicating how
each alternative scores on each criterion. Reading across the settlement row,
an offer to plead guilty with a two year sentence has been made. The number
of hours to consummate the settlement or plea bargain would be twelve hours
at twenty dollars an hour for a salaried assistant state's attorney, for a total
cost of $240. Reading across the trial row, cases of this type average five year
sentences where the defendant is found guilty, which is seventy percent of the
time. The average or expected value is thus three and one-half years. The
number of hours (if the case has to be tried) would be about thirty-six at twenty
dollars an hour for a total cost of $720.
The client of the prosecutor is the state. There normally is no conflict be-
tween the prosecutor and the state. The prosecutor is a salaried employee of
the state, and they are both interested in obtaining good convictions at low
cost. The last column of Table 6 shows the benefits minus costs from the vic-
tim's perspectives which may conflict with the prosecutor's perspective. The
victim is generally only interested in increasing the sentence length, and not
especially in reducing the hourly cost.
2. Handling Criteria Measured On Different Dimensions
Unlike Table 3, where $300 in cost can be subtracted from $1,000 in
benefits, there is no way of directly subtracting $240 in cost from two years in
benefits. There is likewise no direct way of subtracting $720 in cost from three
and one-half years in benefits on the trial row. One can, however, meaningful-
ly subtract downward and note that the increment of trial over settlement is
one and one-half years in benefits and $480 in costs. The problem thus could
reduce to answering the question of which is more desired by the prosecutor,
an incremental one and one-half years or a saving of $480. If one and one-half
years is preferred, then go to trial since doing so gives the incremental one and
one-half years. If saving $480 is preferred, then settle since doing so saves the
$480.
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That approach of comparing increments becomes too complicated where
multiple options and/or multiple benefits are involved. It is also too com-
plicated to allow for sensitivity analysis for the calculation of tie-causing
values. A generally better approach is to compare the two years with the three
and one-half years by expressing both of them as percentages of their sum, as is
shown on Column 3. Likewise, one can compare the $240 with the $720 by ex-
pressing them as percentages of their sum, as is shown in Column 6. One can
then subtract the percentage costs from the percentage benefits in order to ob-
tain the difference shown in Column 7. Differences and sums are shown only
for the total benefits column and the total cost column because the object is to
choose the alternative that is better on benefits minus costs, rather than better
on sentence length, probability of victory, number of hours, or cost per hour.
Column 7 indicates that if the sentence is given equal weight or impor-
tance along with the total hourly cost, then settling is the better alternative. Its
net benefits are a positive 11 percentage points, as contrasted to a negative
eleven percentage points for going to trial. If, however, one considers the
sentence obtained to be at least twice as important as total hourly cost, then
going to trial is the better alternative. This is shown by the algebra in the
lower-right corner of Table 5. One could also say that if one would rather
achieve an extra year of sentencing than save the prosecutor's office $320,
then going to trial is the better alternative. This is shown by the algebra in the
lower-left corner. That information, however, is the same as asking which is
preferred between an extra 1.5 years and an extra $480.
[Vol. i 9: i
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Table 7 shows the tie-causing values for all the information items in Table
6. For example, if the settlement offer goes down from two years to 1.17 years,
then there would be a tie. This is so because 1.17 years as a settlement offer in
Table 4 added to three and one-half years as an average trial result in Table 5
adds to 4.67. If those numbers are converted into part/whole percentages, the
1. 17 becomes twenty-five percent of 4.67, and the 3.5 becomes seventy-five
percent of 4.67. If we then add twenty-five percent as a benefit score to twenty-
five percent as a cost score, settling receives a %B-%C score of zero percent.
Likewise, if we add seventy-five percent as a trial benefits score to seventy-five
percent as a trial cost score, we also receive a %B-%C score for going to trial of
zero percent. This means that any offer below 1.17 years should be rejected if
one gives equal weight to the sentence obtained and the total hourly cost.
One could likewise determine that any of the numbers shown in Table 6
(If substituted for the corresponding numbers in Table 5) will generate a tie be-
tween settling and going to trial on the bottom line of %B-%C. That is the bot-
tom line in this context (rather than $B-$C), since the benefits and costs are
measured on the different dimensions of years and dollars. All the amounts
shown in Table 6 can be calculated by the algebraic approach shown in the
lower-right corner of Table 5 which is analogous to the algebraic approach used
for calculating the tie-causing values in Table 4. Fortunately, the Policy/Goal
Percentaging microcomputer program will soon be available. It will calculate
the tie-causing values for any table like Table 5 with equal or unequal weights
for each benefit goal and each cost goal. One can also by hand or with the
microcomputer program determine the tie-causing values (1) from a defense
perspective where sentences are additional costs rather than benefits, (2) from
a victim perspective where B-C is determined just by the sentence obtained as a
benefit, and (3) a defendant perspective where B-C is determined just by the
sentence received as a cost.14
C. Using a Microcomputer For The Sensitivity Analysis
Tables 8 and 9 show some output for the newly developed personal com-
puter program that can handle most of the sensitivity analysis described in
Tables 1 through 7.
Table 8A shows that a jury trial has a higher expected value by 200
monetary units for the lawyer. The four rows of Table 8B show that a tie be-
tween the alternatives would occur:
1. If the $10,000 predicted damages were only $9,167, or if the combina-
tion of the victory probability and the percentage fee were to drop
from twenty-four to twenty-two.
"For literature describing part/whole percentaging as a means of evaluating alternative decisions which are
measured on different dimensions, see S. NAGEL. PUBLIC POLICY: GOALS, MEANS, AND METHODS 343-54
(1984).
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2. If the $5,000 settlement offer were to rise to $6,000, or if the twenty
percent fee were to rise to twenty-four percent.
3. If the sixty dollar hourly litigation cost were sixty-eight dollars, or if
the twenty-five hours were twenty-eight hours.
4. If the thirty dollars hourly settlement cost were only ten dollars, or if
the ten hours were only three hours.
Table 8C shows that a jury trial has a lower expected value by 400
monetary units for the client. The two rows of Table 8D show that a tie be-
tween the alternatives would occur:
1. If the jury damages were to rise from $10,000 to $11,111, or if the
combination of the victory probability and the percentage fee were to
rise from twenty-four to forty percent.
2. If the $5,000 settlement offer were to go down to $4,500.
Table 9A shows that a settlement has a higher value than going to trial for
the prosecutor. The two rows of Table 9B show a tie between the two alter-
natives would occur:
1. If the settlement offer were to drop from two years to 1.17 years, or if
the trial sentence were to rise from five to six years. The top row also
shows that if sentencing were considered almost twice as important as
saving litigation costs, then there would be a tie.
2. If the settlement cost were to rise from $240 to $411, or if the trial cost
were to fall from $720 to $420. Likewise, if saving litigation costs were
only considered about half as important as sentencing, then there
would be a tie.
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TABLE 8
Using A Microcomputer For The Civil Cases'"
A. The Bottom Line For The Lawyer
Combined
Alternative Rawscores
2 Jury 900.00
3 Settle 700.00
B. Tie-causing Values For The Lawyer
Threshold Analysis
Jury Settle Weight
Jury Damages 9166.67 0.220
Settlement 6000.00 0.240
Litigation Costs 68.00 -28.333
Settlement Costs 10.00 -3.333
C. The Bottom Line For The Client
Combined
Alternative Rawscores
2 Jury 3600.00
3 Settle 4000.00
D. Tie-causing Values For The Client
Threshold Analysis
Jury Settle Weight
Jury Damages 11111.11 0.400
Settlement 4500.00 0.720
"Notes:
a. The relations between the main tables in the article and the sub-tables of Table 8 are:
(I) Table 8A corresponds to the bottom line of Table 3 for the lawyer.
(2) Table 8B corresponds to the main threshold values of Table 4.
(3) Table 8C corresponds to the bottom line of Table 3 for the client.
(4) Table 8D corresponds to the main threshold values of Table 4.
b. Irrelevant information has been removed from Table 8 such as indicating that a $700 settlement con-
stitutes 44% of the total of the damages awarded ($900) plus the settlement ($700). Likewise if one settles,
there can be no jury damages or litigation costs, and if one goes through a jury trial, there can be no set-
tlement or settlement costs. Nothing, however, has been added to the above computer displays.
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TABLE 9
Using A Microcomputer For The Criminal Cases6
A. The Bottom Line For The Prosecutor
Combined
Alternative W P/W
1 Settle 11.36
2 Trial -11.36
B. Tie-causing Values For The Prosecutor
Threshold Analysis
Settle Trial Weight
Avg. Sentence 1.17 6.00 1.833
Total Cost 411.43 420.00 -0.545
6Notes:
a. The relations between the main tables in the article and the sub-tables of Table 9 are:
(1) Table 9A corresponds to the bottom line of Table 6.
(2) Table 9B corresponds to the main threshold values of Table 7.
b. Irrelevant information has been removed from Table 7 such as indicating that a combined weighted
part/whole percentage of + I 1% is 50% of the sum of the two combined absolute percentages.
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To obtain the bottom-line values for the lawyer in Table 8A one inserts in-
to the computer for the trial alternative (1) $10,000 in trial damages weighted
by .60 times .40, and (2) sixty dollars in litigation cost per hour weighted by
twenty-five hours. For the settlement alternative, one inserts (1) $5,000 in set-
tlement amount weighted by .20, and (2) thirty dollars in settlement cost per
hour weighted by ten hours. To obtain the bottom-line values for the client in
Table 8C one inserts for the trial alternative $10,000 in trial damages weighted
by .60 times .60. Likewise, one inserts for the settlement alternative $5,000 in
settlement value weighted by .80. Once that data has been inserted, then ask-
ing the computer for a sensitivity analysis will yield the tie-causing values of
Table 8A or 8D.
To obtain the bottom-line values for the prosecutor in Table 9A one in-
serts into the computer for the trial alternative (1) five years weighted by the
.70 probability, and (2) twenty dollars in litigation cost per hour weighted by
thirty-six hours. For the settlement alternative, one inserts (1) two years
weighted by the 1.00 probability, and (2) twenty dollars in litigation cost per
hour weighted by twelve hours. Once that data has been inserted, then asking
the computer for a sensitivity analysis will yield the tie-causing values of Table
9B provided that one has previously indicated that part/whole percentaging
should be used to deal with the multi-dimensionality of combining years and
dollars.
Thus to obtain the initial results or bottom-lines, one just has to remember
that the probabilities or other multipliers are treated as weights on the dollar-
award columns or the dollar-cost columns. This is a much easier method for in-
putting the information needed for the initial analysis than is the method of
decision trees. The trees may look aesthetic, but they are much more com-
plicated to communicate to the computer, and they are generally incapable of
doing a comprehensive sensitivity analysis. 7
III. DECISION TREES AND LITIGATION STRATEGY
Joyce Kilmer in his famous poem said that "Only God can make a tree."
He was, however, not talking about decision trees. God does not make decision
trees for at least two reasons.
First, decision trees are for people who think of case-outcomes or events in
terms of probabilities of occurring, such as seventy percent, one in four, or
"For literature describing the new microcomputer program for doing sensitivity analysis in litigation
strategy, see Nagel, P/G% Analysis: An Evaluation Aiding Program 9 EVALUATION REV. 209 (1985); S.
NAGEL. DECISION MAKING WITH MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES (Haimes & Chankong ed. 1985) (Policy/Goal
Percentaging as a Form of Multi-Criteria Decision-Making). The microcomputer program can also calculate
the present value for the trial damages, taking into consideration the length of predicted delay and the
prevailing interest and inflation rates. The program can also deal with multiple probabilities of victory, but a
single holistic or gestalt probability may be more meaningful than disaggregated probabilities that do not
capture the total picture.
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highly probable. Since God is an omniscient being, He thinks of events in
terms of either happening or not happening, with nothing in between.
More important for our purposes, even if God did think probabilistically,
He would probably not make decision trees to analyze probabilistic events.
Since He is an omniscient being, He would use a more insightful tool similar to
a policies/goals table or a PG table. Such a table shows options on the rows,
goals on the columns, relations between the options and the goals in the cells,
and a bottom line at the right indicating which option is best on benefits minus
costs. That is the subject of this article.
A. A Decision Tree In Need Of Being Cut Down
Figure 1 shows an impressive decision tree relevant to deciding whether
to sue or not to sue. This tree contains two trunks labeled "Litigate" and "Drop
Suit." The litigate trunk branches into win or lose. The win branch sub-
branches into damages of one, three, and six million dollars. Each of those
branches sub-branch into judgments within two or four years, and each of
those sub-branches into collecting within one year or three years on the judg-
ments. That adds up to fourteen impressive branches or fourteen scenarios.
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FIGURE 1
A Decision Tree Approach To Deciding Whether To Sue Or Not Sue"8
Collect: Scenario Probability
1 year 1 4.6%
2 2.4%
3 8.9%
4 1.6%
5 7.6%
6 9.2%
7 16.4%
8 8.8%
9 1.0%
10 3.2%
11 2.8%
12 3.5%
13 30.0%
100.0%
Present
Value
$ 2.OM
$1.4
$ 1.7
$ 1.2
S 6.1
$ 4.2
$ 5.0
$ 3.5
$12.2
$ 8.4
$10.1
$ 6.9
$ 0.0
Save $ 1.0
"aNotes:
a. The above figure is based on the recommendations of Marc Victor as to how to draw a decision tree. See
Marc Victor, "Litigation Risk Analysis" (Paper presented at ABA annual meeting, 1982). The above
data, however, is purely hypothetical and not meant to reflect any specific case of Marc Victor's or
anyone else.
b. The probability for each scenario is the product of the four probabilities along the decision-tree branches
of the scenario. Thus, .046 equals .70 x .25 x .40 x .65.
c. The present value for each scenario is equal to 3 times the damages, multiplied by .90 for a I-year collec-
tion (10% collection fee) and by .75 for a 3-year collection (25% collection fee). One then discounts or
multiples that figure by 11(.10)t where .10 is the discount rate, and t is the years of delay for judg-
ment and collection. Thus, $2.0 equals $1 x 3 x .90 x l/(l.101.
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To calculate the probability of any of the fourteen scenarios, one
multiplies the four probabilities along the decision tree branches of the
scenario. For example, the .046 probability of the first scenario equals .70 x .25
x .40 x .65. To calculate the present value of any of the fourteen scenarios, one
multiplies three times the damages by ninety percent for a one year collection
(ten percent collection fee) and by seventy-five percent for a three year collec-
tion (twenty-five percent collection fee). One then discounts or multiplies that
figure by 1/(1.1 0) where .10 is the discount rate, and t is the years of delay for
judgment and collection. For example, the two million dollars of the first
scenario equals $1 x 3 x .90 x 1/(I.10)1.
B. Using The Wood Of The Shaky Decision Tree To Make A Sturdy PG
Table
Table 10 analyzes the same data from the perspective of averaging rather
than probabilities, and from the perspective of a PG table rather than a deci-
sion tree.
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TABLE 10
Replacing A Decision Tree With Averaging And A PG Table9
Goals Benefit Items Cost Net
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Average Damages Damages Litigation Benefits
Damages Delay Discounted Discounted Cost Minus Cost
Options to Damages for Collection for Delay (4)-(5)
Not Sue $0 0 years $0 $0 $0 $0
($0 x 1.00) [$0/(l.10)0]
Sue $6.12 5.00 years $5.14 $3.19 $1 $2.19
(2.04 x 3) ($6.12 x .84) [$5.14/(1. 101]
"Notes:
a. Average damages (column I) are calculated by noting that a sample of 100 cases shows:
(I) 30 cases resulted in $0 damages.
(2) 18 (or .25 x 70) resulted in $1 damages, or $18 in total.
(3) 42 (or .60 x 70) resulted in $3 damages, or $126 in total.
(4) 10 (or .15 x 70) resulted in $6 damages, or $60 in total.
(5) Thus, the 100 cases resulted in $204 in damages for an average of $2.04 apiece.
b. Average delay to damages (column 2) is calculated by noting that in the 70 cases in which damages were
awarded:
(I) 28 cases (or .40 x 70) took 2 years to judgment, or 56 years in total.
(2) 42 cases (or .60 x 70) took 4 years to judgment, or 168 years in total.
(3) Thus, the 70 cases took 224 years for an average of 3.2 years to judgment, or 224/70.
(4) 42 cases took I year to collect, or 42 years in total.
(5) 28 cases took 3 years to collect, or 84 years in total.
(6) Thus, the 70 cases took 126 years for an average of 1.80 years to collect, or 126/70.
(7) Thus, the 70 cases took 5.00 years apiece for judgment and collection, or 3.20+ 1.80.
c. The collection-fee multiplier (column 3) is 1.00 minus the collection fee expressed as a decimal. Thus, if
the collection fee is 10%, the collection-fee multiplier is .90. The average collection-fee multiplier is
calculated by noting that the 70 winning cases show:
(1) 42 cases had a .90 multiplier, or 37.8 in total.
(2) 28 cases had a .75 multiplier, or 21.0 in total.
(3) Thus, the 70 cases had 58.8 in grand total for an average of .84 as a multiplier.
d. Damages discounted for delay (column 4) equal average damages multiplied by 1/(1. 10)t where t is the
average delay to damages.
e. The numbers which appear in Table 10 and the above notes are all derived from Figure 1.
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1. Advantages Of The Averaging Approach
On the matter of averaging, one should note that people (including
lawyers) have a great deal of difficulty working with probabilities. They do not,
however, have much trouble understanding the related concept of an average.
A lawyer can easily understand the idea of listing the damages awarded for ten
cases (including cases in which no damages are awarded) and then dividing by
ten to get the average damages awarded, which may be $3,200. That is easier
than thinking that the damages awarded are $4,000 in cases in which liability
is found and that $4,000 has to be discounted by eighty percent in order to ar-
rive at an expected value of $3,200. The eighty percent probability is especially
confusing if the lawyer is irrelevantly told that such a probability represents
four to one odds and a ninety percent probability represents nine to one odds.
Table 10 only talks in terms of averages. It avoids the word probability.
Other advantages of using an averaging approach rather than a probabili-
ty approach in addition to avoiding confusion include:
1. The averaging approach emphasizes empirical data-processing to arriv-
ing at average damages, whereas a probability approach tends to
overemphasize mathematical probability calculations with indepen-
dent probabilities or Bayesian conditional probabilities.
2. The data-processing emphasis is also a welcome improvement over the
possible overemphasis on subjective intuition of the probability ap-
proach.
3. In order to use data-processing to get relevant averages, one has to
have a big database that will cover lots of possible types of cases. This
may now be possible by using the Westlaw or Lexis database for
calculating empirical probabilities by way of quantitative content
analysis programs that are now being developed.
4. Where no data is available, lawyers can probably generate educated es-
timates concerning average damages and other averages better than
they can generate probabilities. I was recently thinking about the ex-
pected value of robbing a grocery store in terms of the monetary crime
benefits discounted by the probability of success. I came up with a fig-
ure that seemed quite unrealistic in comparison to what I generated
when I thought in terms of the average monetary crime benefits across
a set of ten average grocery store robberies, some of which are unsuc-
cessful.
Because lawyers often think in terms of probabilities does not mean doing
so is the best way to analyze litigation. The best way is the way that (1) max-
imizes accuracy in consistently arriving at decisions that maximize benefits
minus costs, and that (2) minimizes the difficulty in quickly arriving at a deci-
sion. Thinking in probabilities is not inconsistent with also thinking in terms of
averages. The two perspectives may be better than either one alone. My own
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previous work has used probabilities." Observing decision trees like the one in
Figure 1 has convinced me there must be an easier way to do it. My previous
examples using probabilities were overly simple. The seventy cases that won
out of one hundred cases averaged about two years to collect after the judg-
ment was awarded. That is simpler to recognize and work with than saying
cases with various probabilities took one year and cases with various other
probabilities took three years.
2. Advantages Of The Policies/Goals Table Format
The second main way in which Table 1 differs from Figure 1 (besides us-
ing averages rather than probabilities) is the use of the PG table format which
lists options along the rows, goals along the columns, and relations in the cells.
Here the options are to sue or not sue which is a simple go/no-go decision. The
bottom line at the right side of a PG table should always be (1) benefits minus
costs, (2) total benefits if all the effects are stated positively, (3) total costs if all
the effects are stated negatively, or (4) some indirect measure of benefits minus
costs.
The advantages of a PG table over a decision tree include:
1. Far easier to type without the artwork of a decision tree.
2. Far simpler in terms of the number of rows since there are only as
many rows as there are options.
3. More consistent with common-sense business practice of picking the
option that is most profitable, or that is positively profitable in a
go/no-go situation.
4. Eliminates virtually all rounding errors.
5. Far easier to read.
6. Allows for an infinite number of degrees of damages, not just one,
three, and six million dollars. In calculating an average, the damages
can be any amount.
7. Allows for an infinite number of degrees of delay, not just two or four
years on judgment, or one and three years on collection. In
calculating average delay, the time periods can be any amount.
8. Easily allows for more plaintiff choices than just suing or not suing,
such as sue with a jury trial, sue with a bench trial, settle with a struc-
tured settlement, settle with a flat payoff, or reject the case
altogether.
9. Easily allows for a defendant perspective of defending with a jury
trial request, defending with no jury trial request, offering various
structured settlements, or offering various flat payoffs.
10. Easily allows for sensitivity analysis whereby any of the benefit or
cost items can be expressed in terms of a threshold value that would
2ONagel, Applying Decision Science to the Practice of Law, 30 PRAc. LAW 13-22 (1984).
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make for a tie between suing and not suing at the bottom line.
11. Easily allows for sensitivity analysis whereby any of the benefit or
cost items can be expressed as a range between minimum and max-
imum values.
12. Easily allows for nonmonetary benefits and nonmonetary costs
which would be involved in criminal cases and possibly civil cases
that do not involve damages.
13. The arithmetic is much simpler.
14. There is no unnecessary disaggregation into so many pieces like four-
teen scenarios. The PG table disaggregates the decision-making into
benefit items, cost items, and B-C net items. The PG table thus forces
the decision-maker to think about each of those goal components in
order to decide between the two options available. Delay and collec-
tion can be considered costs, negative benefits, or simply items that
are relevant to determining the true benefits.
15. A PG table could show the degree of risk adverseness as a cost of su-
ing, or show the degree of risk preference as a benefit of suing. Being
risk adverse is, however, a non-monetary cost, and being a risk
preferer is a non-monetary benefit. PG tables can deal with a mix of
monetary and non-monetary variables by methods described in the
references at the end of this article.
16. Easily allows for making allocation decisions as to how much time or
money should be invested in alternative case activities or cases.
17. Decision trees tend to encourage lots of branches concerning relative-
ly trivial matters at the ending branches such as how long it takes to
collect on a judgment that is already awarded, and a slighting of more
important matters like the diversity of factors that influence winning
and losing at the initial branches.
18. The PG table can be easily handled with a microcomputer program
which provides for prompting and sensitivity analysis.
19. The decision matrix or PG table can easily handle multiple alter-
natives, not just two alternatives.
20. The decision matrix can handle non-monetary criteria, not just
monetary ones.
21. The decision matrix can add and subtract alternatives, criteria, and
relations, and make other sensitivity changes with relative ease in
order to see how they affect the bottom-line conclusions.
C. Spreading PG Tables To Every Lawyer's Office
What may be needed to implement the above ideas and related ideas are
entrepreneurial activities like the following:
1. A Judicial Prediction Service - This could be a service charging so
many dollars per hour of microcomputer time on a telephone modem
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or hookup offering systematic predictions of damages, non-damage
judgments, averages, and probabilities drawing on Westlaw, Lexis,
Jury Verdict Research Service and/or other databases.
2. A Lawyer Decision-Making Service - This could also be a service
charging so many dollars per hour of microcomputer time on a
telephone modem, but offering an analysis in the form of PG tables.
Relevant decision-making problems could include:
(1) Choosing among alternative clients, plaintiffs, defendants, firms, or
other entities to represent, prosecute, or sue.
(2) Deciding whether to go to trial or accept a settlement where tort,
contract, or property damages, or other remedies are involved.
(3) Deciding on an optimum level of time to spend on big cases, or how
to allocate one's time resources among many cases.
3. A series of training workshops across various U.S. cities each year
designed to train lawyers in the use of the Judicial Prediction Service
and the Lawyer Decision-Making Service. Those workshops would
deal with decision analysis methods involving mutually exclusive alter-
natives, combinations of alternatives, decision-making under condi-
tions of risk, decisions where doing too much or too little is
undesirable, and decisions that involve allocating scarce resources
among people, activities, and places.
The above ideas would have sounded like science fiction a few years ago,
but not now. Seventy percent of all law offices in the country now have at least
one data-processing or word-processing terminal and TV monitor which could
be made capable of taking a telephone modem or hookup.2 To the extent that
these kinds of developments would make both lawyers and clients better off,
the developments would probably be approved by whatever entities are both
omniscient and omnibenevolent 2
D. Using A Microcomputer For Processing A PG Table Or Decision Matrix
Tables 11, 12 and 13 show how the same data from Figure 1 can be more
meaningfully analyzed by the microcomputer program called Policy/Goal
Percentaging than by a decision-tree approach.
The program is called Policy-Goal Percentaging because it relates policies,
decisions, or other alternatives to goals or criteria in order to decide which deci-
sion or combination is best in light of the alternatives, goals, and relations. The
program uses percentaging to deal with the fact that the goals may often be
measured on different dimensions like time, distance, attitude scales, or dollars,
which can be converted to dimensionless part/whole percentages in order to
allow for meaningful addition across goals. In this example, however, only
dollars are involved.
"Keeffe, How to Shop for Your Firms Computer, 10 A.B.A. J. 161 (May 1984).
2The author thanks Marc Victor for having partly inspired this article by his stimulating work on litigation
risk analysis.
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1. Alternatives And Criteria
Each table shows one or more computer displays. All the data comes from
Figure 1. Table 11 A shows the two alternatives of either litigate or drop the
suit.
TABLE 11
The Alternatives and the Criteria"
A. The Alternatives Or Available Decisions
Budgets
Alternative Minimum Actual
1 Litigate 0.00 0.00
2 Drop Suit 0.00 0.00
B. The Criteria (Damages And Costs)
Criterion Meas. Unit Weight
S*Scenario 1 $ 0.05
2*S 2 0.02
3S 3 0.09
4*S 4 0.02
5*S 5 0.08
6*S 6 0.09
7*S 7 0.16
8*S 8 0.09
9*S 9 0.01
10*S 10 0.03
1I*S 11 0.03
12*S 12 0.04
13*Litigation Costs -1.00
nNotes:
a. There is no minimum budget per decision or past actual budget, since this is a choosing problem, rather
than a budget-allocation problem.
b. The measurement unit is millions of dollars for all the criteria. Each criterion is weighted by the probabili-
ty of its occurring.
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It could easily expand to more than two alternatives such as (1) litigate via
a jury trial, (2) litigate via a bench trial, (3) numerous forms of settlement, and
(4) drop the suit. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 11 A indicate this is not a budget
allocation problem. Thus it does not have any minimum budget for each alter-
native or previous actual budget.
Table II B shows the criteria for judging between the alternatives. In this
context, the criteria refer to damages and costs. There are twelve different
ways of arriving at different damage levels. Damages 1 or Scenario 1 involves
(1) litigating, rathen dropping the suit, (2) winning, rather than losing, (3) ob-
taining damages of one million dollars, rather than three million or six million
dollars, (4) obtaining the judgment within two years of winning, rather than
four years, and (5) collecting within one year from the time the judgment was
awarded, rather than three years. The probabilities of the occurrence of events
2, 3, 4, and 5 are seventy, twenty-five, forty, and sixty-five percent, respective-
ly. Multiplying those independent probabilities together gives the probability
of Damages 1 or Scenario 1 occurring. That probability is .045 5 or five percent
rounded to two decimal places, which is the figure shown in the "Weight" col-
umn. The measurement-unit column indicates that for this problem, all the
criteria are measured in dollars. The litigation costs are not discounted by a
probability. They are given a negative weight because being high on cost is
undesirable, whereas being high on each of the twelve damage amounts is
desirable from a plaintiffs perspective.
2. Relations And Transformations
Table 12A shows the relations between the alternatives and the twelve
damages criteria and one cost criteria. Scenario 1, for example, says the
damages with that set of events will be two million dollars. That figure is ar-
rived at by tripling the one million dollars in single damages to consider treble
damages. The three million dollars is then multiplied by ninety percent to con-
sider the ten percent collection fee. That figure is then multiplied by 1/(1. 10)1 to
consider the ten percent interest or discount rate and the three year waiting
period. A similar interpretation should be given to each figure in Table 12A.
The litigation costs are one million dollars.
[Vol. ! 9:1
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TABLE 12
The Relations Between The Alternatives And The Criteria"
Aiternative/Criteria Scoring
S2 S3
1.40 1.70
0.00 0.00
S7
5.00
0.00
S 12
6.90
0.00
S8
3.50
0.00
Litigation Costs
1.00
0.00
B. Transforming The Relations
X2 =XI
X = X2/0.908
Present value rate = 0.10
Actual value :term = 3.00
4Notes:
a. The relations are in millions of dollars, as the measurement unit in Table II B should indicate.
b. The commands in Table 12B allow the raw scores of Table 12A to be multiplied or divided by any factor.
They also enable the present value or future value of any amount in Table 12A to be calculated.
A. The Relations
Litigate
Drop Suit
Litigate
Drop Suit
Litigate
Drop Suit
Scenario
2.00
0.00
S6
4.20
0.00
Sll
10.10
0.00
S4
1.20
0.00
S9
12.20
0.00
S5
6.10
0.00
S 10
8.40
0.00
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Table 12B shows how the program can transform the original relations or
raw scores. The top line of those transformation commands enables the raw
score to be multiplied. This could include multiplying the one milion dollar by
three, or by ninety percent. The second line allows the raw score to be divided
by any number. The third line specifies the discount rate for calculating pres-
ent or future values. The fourth line specifies the term or time period. By exer-
cising appropriate options, one can calculate the present value of an amount to
be received in the future, or calculate the future value of an amount received
in the present. Those calculations take into consideration the interest rate, the
term, and having the interest remain in the account or the firm to draw com-
pound interest. The amounts shown in Table 12A have already been dis-
counted for the collection fee and for the delay in being received.
3. Initial Analysis And Sensitivity
Table 13A shows the initial decision by asking the computer what is the
best decision in light of the alternatives available (Table 11 A), the criteria for
judging the alternatives and the weights of the criteria (Table 11 B), and the
relations between the alternatives and the criteria (Table 12A). The answer is
that the total expected value for litigating is $4.19 million. That represents
$3.19 million in damages minus the one million dollar in litigation costs. If the
suit is dropped, there are no benefits and no costs. The combined raw score for
dropping the suit is thus zero.
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TABLE 13
The Initial Decision And The Sensitivity Analysis25
A. The Initial Decision Or Analysis
Combined
Alternative Rawscores
1 Litigate 2.19
2 Drop Suit 0.00
B. The Sensitivity Analyses
Threshold Analysis
Litigate Drop Suit Weight
Scenario 1 -45.59 47.59 -1.049
S2 -89.82 91.22 -1.540
S3 -22.90 24.60 -1.199
S4 -135.62 136.82 -1.808
S 5 -22.71 28.81 -0.283
S 6 -19.60 23.80 -0.429
S 7 -8.35 13.35 -0.274
S 8 -21.38 24.88 -0.537
S 9 -206.72 218.92 -0.169
S 10 -60.01 68.41 -0.229
S 11 -68.09 78.19 -0.189
S 12 -55.65 62.55 -0.282
Litigation Costs 3.19 -2.19 -3.189
"Notes:
a. The combined raw scores in Table 13A are calculated by multiplying the probability weights of Table
lib against the relation scores of Table 12A and then adding the products.
b. The threshold values in Table 13B are calculated by setting up a threshold equation in which the sum of
the above-mentioned litigating products are set equal to the sum of the above-mentioned suit-dropping
products. The equation has 26 terms on each side, including 13 relation scores and 13 weights for
litigating, and 13 relation scores and 13 weights for dropping the suit.
c. One then treats each of the 39 inputs as an unknown and asks the question, "To what value would that
input have to change in order to make for a perfect equality between the profitability of litigating and the
profitability of dropping the suit."
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Table 13B provides especially useful information. It shows what the raw
scores in Table 12A would have to change to in order for the second place
alternative (of dropping the suit) to become tied with the first place alternative
(of litigating). There are thirteen criteria and two alternatives. That means
there are twenty-six input scores in Table 12A and 13 probabilities in Table
11 B that could change to enable dropping the suit to become as profitable as
litigating. Of those thirty-nine values, only one is numerically possible because
the gap between litigating and dropping the suit is so large. In a more realistic
example where the two alternatives might be closer in their combined raw
scores, any of the thirty-nine or so input values could conceivably change
enough to cause the initial best alternative to become second best.
Examples of impossible changes include the impossibility of (1) a scenario
bringing in negative damages through litigation, which is what it would take
for any one scenario to make a tie between the alternatives in Table 4A, (2) a
scenario bringing in positive damages through dropping the suit, which is
equally meaningless, or (3) a scenario having a negative probability, which is
impossible since probabilities only go from 0 to 1.00. The only room for
eliminating the greater profitability of litigating by way of one input change
would be if the litigation costs were to rise from one million dollars to $3.19
million. Litigating would then be as profitable or unprofitable as dropping the
suit. Thus the decision to litigate can be considered firmly in first place, unless
there is a possibility that the litigation costs are being so badly misestimated
that they may be more than three times the one million dollars predicted. One
can easily test to see that any of these threshold values will result in a tie be-
tween litigating and dropping the suit by inserting any one threshold value in
place of its original input value back in either Table 12A or 11 B and then ask-
ing for a new initial analysis.
Threshold values can be quite useful in probability analysis with or
without decision trees, especially in deciding litigation strategies. They can in-
dicate to what figure the settlement value has to increase in order for a settle-
ment to be as profitable as going to trial. They can indicate the threshold value
for any probability so as to convert questions of the form "What is the prob-
ability?" into questions of the form "Is the probability likely to be higher or
lower than the threshold value?" The latter type of question is much easier for
lawyers and others to handle. If an input score is very close to its threshold
score, that tells the decision-maker that he or she should probably seek addi-
tional information to be sure the input score is correct since a small change
could affect which alternative is best. If all the input values are substantially
different than their threshold values, then one can feel more confidence in ac-
cepting an initial decision like that shown in Table 13A.
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E. Comparing Decision Matrices And Decision Trees
Going from Figure I to Tables 11, 12, and 13 requires approximately five
minutes or less of key strokes. There is no question that a decision matrix ap-
proach like that shown in Tables 11, 12, and 13 is much faster to input and
manipulate than a decision-tree approach with or without the aid of com-
puters. There are microcomputer decision-tree programs such as the Arborist
developed by Texas Instruments. It requires considerable time and patience to
be able to input the information from Figure 1. More important, it is almost
psychologically impossible to do the algebra needed for calculating a set of
threshold values, break-even values, or indifference points for thirty-nine input
items by hand. At the present time, no other existing microcomputer program
seems capable of calculating those useful threshold values.
IV. SOME CONCLUSIONS
The idea of sensitivity analysis includes more than just the calculation of
tie-causing values, but that is the most important part of analyzing the effects
on decisions of changing items of input information. Other forms of sensitivity
analysis that are discussed elsewhere include (1) insensitivity ranges within
which scores can vary without affecting the best alternative; (2) change slopes,
which show how much the gap between the two leading alternatives is in-
fluenced by a one unit change in each input; (3) best and worst case scenario
analysis whereby one does a version of Table 1 that is most favorable toward
settling and a version that is least favorable in order to obtain insights into
whether one should settle or go to trial, and (4) convergence analysis whereby
one determines how low a figure the weight for a goal can be and yet the goal
will dominate the other goals in determining the best alternative.
The idea of sensitivity analysis and tie-causing values can be a highly
useful tool in decision-making. It can be more valuable than the "what-if"
analysis that is associated with spreadsheet programs like Lotus 1-2-3. Lotus
does what-if analysis whereby one asks what would be the effect of changing a
cell or information item in Table 3 or 4 on the bottom profit for settling versus
going to trial. In Table 3, there are sixteen information items that lead to the
two profit figures. Each item may be reasonably capable of taking five dif-
ferent values. That means if one wants to do a comprehensive what-if analysis,
then one would have to make approximately eighty changes, and observe the
effect of each of the separate changes on the profit figures.
The sensitivity analysis of Table 4, however, tells us instantly that any of-
fer greater than $6,000 will make settling more profitable, and any offer less
than $6,000 will make going to trial more profitable if all the other numbers
are held constant. One does not have to experiment with offers of $4,000,
$5,500, $6,500, $7,000, and so on in order to determine their effects. The same
is true of the sensitivity analysis or tie-causing values of the other fifteen infor-
Summer, 19851
45
Nagel: Microcomputers, Risk Analysis
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1986
AKRON LAW REVIEW
mation items. The what-if system of spreadsheet analysis is totally inapplicable
to Table 5 dealing with benefits measured in years and costs measured in
dollars, since the two profit figures are not arrived at by simply adding and sub-
tracting across the rows. The computerized sensitivity analysis, however, has
no trouble calculating tie-causing values under such circumstances.
There are other microcomputer procedures that are useful as decision-
making tools for trial lawyers. These include procedures designed to predict the
probabilities of victory in civil or criminal cases, or to predict damages or
sentences likely to be received. The outputs of those programs can be the in-
puts to the kind of decision-making analysis shown in Tables 3 and 6, which in
turn are the inputs to the sensitivity analysis shown in Tables 4, 5 and 7. There
are also systematic procedures designed to enable attorneys to sequence cases
and allocate time to cases in order to maximize benefits minus costs.' The
most useful methodology may, however, be the methodology of calculating tie-
causing values in order to make choices between conflicting alternatives,
especially whether to go to trial or accept a settlement.2 7
a For literature describing microcomputer procedures for judicial prediction and attorney-time allocation,
see Nagel, Using Microcomputers and P/G% to Predict Court Cases 18 AKRON L. REV. 541 (1985).
27For further details concerning the subject matter of this article and the broader context of decision science
applied to law, see S. NAGEL. USING PERSONAL COMPUTERS FOR DECISION MAKING AIDS IN LAW PRACTICE
(American Law Institute-American Bar Association, 1985).
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